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THE QUEST FOR TEACHER QUALITY:
EARLY LESSONS FROM RACE TO THE TOP AND
STATE LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS REGARDING
TEACHER EVALUATION
INTRODUCTION
The dismal state of public education in the United States is widely
acknowledged, and teachers have increasingly become scapegoats for
the unconscionable systemic failure to sufficiently educate our youth.'
Bolstering the argument that teachers are to blame is the shocking
infrequency with which teachers are dismissed for incompetence.2
This phenomenon, paired with infrequent but highly publicized stories
of unquestionably incompetent educators drawing paychecks while
sitting idle,3 degrades the teaching profession and perpetuates the in-
justice of denying many American students an adequate public
education.4
Yet, this systematic failure is not the fault of teachers, but rather the
result of ineffective evaluation policies that have produced a deeply
engrained practice of treating all teachers as if they are equally tal-
ented. Terminating an incompetent teacher is neither a novel idea nor
a legal impossibility-yet it rarely occurs. 5 Frequently, teachers un-
ions and the tenure system are asked to shoulder the blame. Critics
from politicians to parents have argued that unions protect un-
derperforming teachers and prevent districts from making changes to
improve educational outcomes for students. 6 Specifically, opponents
1. See Tom Crean, Lessons of SB 7 Bill-Illinois Democrats' Assault .on Teachers' Unions,
SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE (June 9, 2011), http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/articlel4.php?
id=1615; Howard Ryan, Billionaires Target Teachers-And Take the Gloves Off in Illinois, LA-
BOR NoTEs (Dec. 21, 2010), http://labornotes.orgfblogs/2010/l2lbillionaires-target-teachersE2
%80%94and-take-gloves-illinois.
2. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
3. See Steven Brill, The Rubber Room: The Battle over New York City's Worst Teachers, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 31, 2009, at 30. The Rubber Room describes the holding rooms that are home to
teachers who have been removed from the classroom for disciplinary and performance reasons.
Id. While their dismissal hearings await arbitration, the teachers receive full salaries. Id.
4. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
5. See Andrew J. Rotherham, Fixing Teacher Tenure Without a Pass-Fail Grade, TIME (Jan.
27, 2011), http:/lwww.time.comltime/nation/article/0,8599,2044529,00.html.
6. Are Teachers Unions to Blame for Failing Schools?, Intelligence Squared U.S., NPR (Mar.
23, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=125019386.
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of teachers unions claim that unions have negotiated protections for
their members that make it difficult to remove ineffective teachers.7
The tenure system, despite accusations to the contrary, was not de-
signed to protect ineffective teachers.8 In reality, tenure is merely a
legal commitment to procedural due process. 9 If a district wants to
terminate a teacher, tenure obligates the district to provide notice of
and a hearing on the grounds for termination. 10 Despite its infrequent
occurrence, tenure does not prohibit a teacher from being dismissed.11
However, the confusion surrounding teacher evaluation and the legal
process of dismissal has created the belief, and occasionally the real-
ity, that it is so costly and difficult to fire an ineffective teacher that
administrators shy away from the process. 12 The true barrier to in-
creasing performance standards for teachers and dismissing those who
are truly incompetent is the widespread use of ineffective and unrelia-
ble procedures for teacher evaluation. 13 The use of inadequate
teacher evaluation systems makes it difficult for school districts to
identify ineffective, effective, or exceptional teachers.' 4 If a district
cannot identify a teacher as ineffective, it cannot pursue dismissal on
grounds of incompetence because doing so would violate the require-
ments of procedural due process. 15 To remedy this problem, and en-
sure that only effective teachers are tasked with educating our youth,
states must engage in comprehensive reform of teacher evaluation
policies. 16
Race to the Top offers hope that comprehensive reforms will take
place and that public education in the United States will improve as a
7. See, e.g., Transcript: Don't Blame Teachers Unions for Our Failing Schools, INTELLIGENCE
SQUARED U.S. 1, 5 (Mar. 16, 2010), http://intelligencesquaredus.org/images/debates/past/tran-
scripts/teachers-unions.pdf. In a public education debate hosted by Intelligence Squared, Terry
Moe, a professor of education who has written extensively in opposition to teachers unions,
claimed that teachers unions have fought for protections in labor contracts that "make it virtu-
ally impossible to get bad teachers out of the classroom." Id.
8. Perry Zirkel, The Myth of Teacher Tenure, WASH. POST (July 13, 2010, 6:30 AM), http://
voices.washingtonpost.comlanswer-sheet/teachers/the-myth-of-teacher-tenure.html.
9. Id.
10. Id. Generally accepted grounds for termination include incompetency, insubordination,
and immorality. Id.
11. Id.
12. See M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, TIME (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.time.com
time/nation/article/0,8599,1859505,00.html (noting that the costs of dismissing a teacher can total
nearly $100,000).
13. DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, THE WIDGET EFFECT: OUR
NATIONAL FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON DIFFERENCES IN TEACHER EFFECTIVE-
NESS 2 (2d ed. 2009), available at http://widgeteffect.org/downloads/TheWidgetEffect.pdf.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 7.
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result.17 By providing financial incentives for states to create high-
quality, comprehensive teacher evaluation systems, Race to the Top
motivates states to create high standards for teacher performance and
to support teachers in improving their practice. 18 The lessons from
the early winners of Race to the Top demonstrate that prioritizing
teacher effectiveness is a critical but complex undertaking. 19 The ex-
periences of the winning states provide standards and best practices
that other states should adopt to create manageable and credible eval-
uation systems, which would help ensure that American students have
equal access to a high-quality public education.
This Comment asserts that states seeking to improve education for
students must create legislation that prioritizes measures to identify
and increase teacher effectiveness. States must also implement strate-
gies to attract and retain highly qualified teachers. Additionally, this
Comment argues that both union representation and the tenure sys-
tem can be leveraged to entice highly qualified candidates to the pro-
fession by offering job security and career advancement. Finally, this
Comment advocates for a streamlined teacher evaluation and dismis-
sal process that honors the due process rights of teachers while mini-
mizing the procedural burden borne by administrators. This model
will ensure highly effective teachers-the key factor that has consist-
ently led to higher student achievement. As a result, students in pub-
lic schools will truly have access to high-quality instruction, and the
achievement gap between students with access to privilege and stu-
dents without can finally be narrowed.
II. BACKGROUND
Public education in the United States is in a state of crisis. Nation-
wide, only about 72% of students graduated from high school on time
in 2008.20 In urban districts, that number drops significantly-only
59% in New York City public schools and 55.8% in Chicago public
schools in 2010.21 Among those students who manage to graduate,
17. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE Top PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf. Race to
the Top is a competitve grant program administered by the U.S. Department of Education. Id.
Comprehensive reform to teacher evaluation is one of its highest priorities. Id. at 2.
18. See infra notes 186-216 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 186-216 and accompanying text.
20. Jason Koebler, National High School Graduation Rates Improve, U.S. NEWS (June 13,
2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/high-school-notes/2011/06/13/national-high-
school-graduation-rates-improve.
21. Rachel Monahan, New York City High School Graduation Rate Up, but 75% of Students
Not Prepared for College, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 14, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://articles.nydaily
news.com/2011-06-14/local/29675551_1_graduation-rate-english-regents-regents-exams; Cassan-
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few possess the baseline skills needed to succeed in college.2 2 Further,
when a young American is able to clear these hurdles and receive a
college degree, she is still likely to lag behind her international coun-
terparts.2 3 These dismal statistics affect not only our nation's youth,
but also the health of our nation's economy.2 4 In the highly competi-
tive global marketplace, American college graduates cannot compete
with international graduates who received superior public
educations.25
This Part examines how the failure to address teacher effectiveness
has contributed to the dismal state of public education. First, it de-
scribes the current problems created by ineffective teacher evaluation
systems, as well as recent legislative attempts to improve teacher ef-
fectiveness. 26 Second, it summarizes the challenges regarding teacher
evaluation and dismissal in light of due process concerns. 27
A. Teacher Quality and the "Widget Effect"
Ineffective teacher evaluation procedures have resulted in several
problems that undermine the efficacy of public education. By failing
to meaningfully evaluate teachers, school districts allow ineffective
teachers to remain in the classroom, render themselves powerless to
remove them, and deprive students of quality instruction.28 This fail-
ure prevents administrations from identifying high-quality teachers
dra West, For the Record: High School Graduation Rates, CATALYST CHI. (July 14, 2011), http:H
www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2011/07/14/record-high-school-graduation-rates.
22. See Monahan, supra note 21 (stating that although New York City's high school gradua-
tion rate increased, only 25% of graduates possessed the skills to adequately prepare them for
college).
23. Cf U.S. Falls in World Education Rankings, Rated 'Average', HUFFINGTON POST, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/us-falls-in-world-education-rankings-n-793185.htmi (last
updated Oct. 1, 2012, 10:28 AM). A three-yearly international study, known as the OECD Pro-
gramme for International Student Assessment (PISA) report, compares the knowledge and
skills of fifteen-year-olds in seventy countries around the world. Id. This report ranked the
United States fourteenth out of thirty-four countries for reading skills, seventeenth for science,
and a below-average twenty-fifth for mathematics. Id.
24. See ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., THE HIGH COST OF HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS:
WHAT THE NATION PAYS FOR INADEQUATE HIGH SCHOOLS 1 (2007), available at www.all4ed.
org/files/archive/publications/HighCost.pdf (explaining that if the high school students who
dropped out instead of graduating as part of the class of 2007 had actually graduated, they would
have contributed an additional $329 billion in income to the national economy over the course of
their lifetimes).
25. See generally Eric A. Hanushek & Paul E. Peterson, Why Can't American Students Com-
pete with the Rest of the World?, NEWSWEEK (ATLANTIC EDITION), Sept. 5, 2011.
26. See infra notes 28-35, 60-67 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 115-38 and accompanying text.
28. See generally WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 2 ("[T]enured teachers are identified as
ineffective and dismissed from employment with exceptional infrequency."). '
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and leveraging their skills to maximize student achievement. 29 Fi-
nally, in the absence of meaningful evaluation procedures, all teachers
are treated as equals, thus devaluing true excellence and inhibiting
growth. 30
The New Teacher Project (TNTP) 31 terms this failure to identify
teacher quality as "The Widget Effect. '32 The Widget Effect is "the
tendency of school districts to assume classroom effectiveness is the
same from teacher to teacher," leading them to treat teachers as
equivalent, "interchangeable parts."' 33 Yet teachers clearly impact stu-
dent achievement in different ways. 34 Multiple studies have "shown
that there are large differences in effectiveness from one teacher to
another and that these differences can have a lifelong impact on
students." 35
Following the passage of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), policy-
makers attempted to address the quality of the teaching force by re-
quiring specific degrees, pre-service tests, and state certification. 36
However, once teachers were hired, little was done to differentiate
them by ability. 37 Tenure was routinely awarded after two or three
years and very few teachers were dismissed.38 Both critics and propo-
nents of tenure acknowledge that the current system demands re-
form.39 Albert Shanker, the late, long-time president of the American
Federation of Teachers, warned that "districts paid too little attention
to the quality of teaching when making tenure decisions. '40 Thus, it is
both conceivable and likely that poor quality teachers have achieved
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. About TNTP, TNTP, http://www.tntp.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 21, 2013) ("TNTP is a
national nonprofit committed to ending the injustice of educational inequality. Founded by
teachers in 1997, TNTP works with schools, districts and states to provide excellent teachers to
the students who need them most and advance policies and practices that ensure effective teach-
ing in every classroom.").
32. WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 4.
33. Id.
34. See generally TNTP, 'MET' MADE SIMPLE: BUILDING RESEARCH-BASED TEACHER EVAL-
UATIONS (2012), available at http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTPMETMadeSimple-2012.
pdf.
35. Id. at 1.
36. ROBERT GORDON ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THE BROOKINGS INST., IDENTIFYING
EFFECTIVE TEACHERS USING PERFORMANCE ON THE JOB 5 (2006), available at www.brookings.
edu/views/papers/200604hamilton-1.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally JOAN BARATZ-SNOWDEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FIXING TENURE: A
PROPOSAL FOR ASSURING TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS AND DUE PROCESS (2009), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/teacher-tenure.pdf.
40. Id. at 7.
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tenure. 41 Outlandish stories of teachers maintaining employment de-
spite allegations of serious misconduct or incompetence have received
widespread attention. 42 The allegation that incompetent teachers con-
tinue to teach in public school classrooms throughout the country is
bolstered by statistics showing that through 2011, very few teachers
received negative evaluations and even fewer teachers were
dismissed.43
A potentially premature or indiscriminate award of tenure is not
the only factor that allows an ineffective teacher to remain in the
classroom. Lack of both evaluation expertise and legal knowledge
also leads administrators to contribute to the Widget Effect.44 Evi-
dence suggests that administrators, who typically bear sole responsi-
bility for carrying out teacher evaluations, are not sufficiently trained
on evaluation procedures and their related legal responsibilities. 45 At
Harvard's 1994 and 1995 summer institute on education law, a group
of school administrators and attorneys received low scores on a quiz
assessing legal knowledge related to teacher evaluation.46 Similarly,
at a Connecticut professional development conference for school ad-
ministrators, the administrators engaged in a hypothetical case scena-
rio concerning teacher evaluation and then attempted to predict the
outcome of the case. 47 One hundred administrators voted unani-
mously, and erroneously, that the school district had lost.48 Finally, in
the twelve districts surveyed in The Widget Effect, only 51% of admin-
istrators claimed that they had an adequate level of training in how to
conduct an effective evaluation. 49
This practice of underutilizing evaluation systems and awarding all
teachers the same rating is well documented. 50 A 2009 study revealed
that in districts that used binary ratings, rating teachers either as satis-
factory or unsatisfactory, more than 99% of teachers were rated as
41. See id.
42. See Brill, supra note 3.
43. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
44. See Perry Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for Performance Evaluation of Public School Profes-
sional Personnel, 172 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (West 2003); see also WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13,
at 20.
45. See Zirkel, supra note 44 at 3 ("As an overlapping matter, the knowledge base of the
applicable legal requirements among those responsible for the evaluation of professional person-
nel in the public schools is limited, not being clearly cognizant of legal requirements as compared
with professional norms.").
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 5, 22.
50. See id. at 6.
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satisfactory.51 In the few surveyed districts that used multi-tiered rat-
ing systems, 94% of teachers were rated in the top two categories and
less than 1% were rated unsatisfactory.5 2 Yet in this same study, both
"teachers and administrators agree[d] that there [was] a small but sig-
nificant subset of teachers who perform[ed] poorly."' 53 Furthermore,
an overwhelming majority of teachers and administrators (68% and
91%, respectively) believed that dismissing poor performing teachers
was important to maintaining high-quality instructional teams.54 Nev-
ertheless, these ineffective teachers continued to teach. 55
Poorly designed evaluation systems, inadequate training, and the
accepted practice of awarding tenure to virtually all teachers have cre-
ated the Widget Effect.56 The Widget Effect thus leads excellent
teachers to be valued professionally at the same exact level as their
underperforming peers.57 "In its denial of individual strengths and
weaknesses, [the Widget Effect] is deeply disrespectful to teachers. 58
Moreover, it is thoroughly detrimental to students in public schools
due to "its indifference to instructional effectiveness." 59
B. Highly Qualified Versus Highly Effective
The implications of the Widget Effect caused policymakers to re-
think how they could use teacher evaluation to demand and enhance
teacher quality and improve outcomes for students. In recent de-
cades, federal and state legislation defined teacher quality through
certificate or credential programs. 60 Indeed, NCLB demanded that
states create measures to place "highly qualified teachers" in class-
rooms. 61 Under NCLB, "highly qualified" merely meant that a
teacher had obtained full state credentials.62 Furthermore, states
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 16.
54. Id.
55. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 6.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id.
60. GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, at 5.
61. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7801(23) (2006); see also 34 C.F.R. § 200.56
(2012).
62. See 20 U.S.C. § 7801(23).
A teacher described in § 200.55(a) and (b)(1) is a "highly qualified teacher" if the
teacher meets the requirements in paragraph (a) and paragraph (b), (c), or (d) of this
section.
(a) In general. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, a teacher
covered under § 200.55 must-
10672013]
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could bypass this minimal standard via a loophole in the NCLB legis-
lation that allowed states to use emergency certification for teachers in
high-need subject areas. 63
In the years following the passage of NCLB, it became apparent
that establishing credential-based standards was insufficient with re-
gards to increasing student achievement. 64 "Highly qualified" teach-
ers were not necessarily highly effective. 65 Thus, the focus on
education reform narrowed toward defining and assessing teacher ef-
(i) Have obtained full State certification as a teacher, which may include certifica-
tion obtained through alternative routes to certification; or
(ii)(A) Have passed the State teacher licensing examination; and
(B) Hold a license to teach in the State.
34 C.F.R. § 200.56.
63. See 20 U.S.C. § 7801(23).
(2) A teacher [is considered highly qualified] if the teacher-
(i) Has fulfilled the State's certification and licensure requirements applicable to the
years of experience the teacher possesses; or
(ii) Is participating in an alternative route to certification program under which-
(A) The teacher-
(1) Receives high-quality professional development that is sustained, intensive, and
classroom-focused in order to have a positive and lasting impact on classroom instruc-
tion, before and while teaching;
(2) Participates in a program of intensive supervision that consists of structured gui-
dance and regular ongoing support for teachers or a teacher mentoring program;
(3) Assumes functions as a teacher only for a specified period of time not to exceed
three years; and
(4) Demonstrates satisfactory progress toward full certification as prescribed by the
State; and
(B) The State ensures, through its certification and licensure process, that the provi-
sions in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section are met.
34 C.F.R. § 200.56.
This second provision allows states to create or partner with "alternative" certification pro-
grams, such as Teach for America. See generally Julian Vasquez Heilig et al., Alternative Certifi-
cation and Teach for America: The Search for High Quality Teachers, 20 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
388 (2011). These programs bypass the traditional route of studying education at a four-year
university, student teaching for a semester or a school year, and receiving teaching certification
as a component of an undergraduate or graduate degree. Id. at 392. Instead, in alternative
certification programs, which are often highly selective, individuals who have not studied educa-
tion are permitted to receive emergency certification to teach in high-need areas or high-needs
schools. Id. at 390. These teachers are often sent to the classroom with only five weeks of
preparation. See id. at 392. However, under NCLB they are "highly qualified." Id. at 389-90.
64. "A growing body of research ... suggests that . . . certification of teachers bears little
relationship to teacher effectiveness (measured by impacts of student achievement)." GORDON
ET AL., supra note 36.
65. "To put it simply, teachers vary considerably in the extent to which they promote student
learning, but whether a teacher is certified or not is largely irrelevant to predicting his or her
effectiveness." Id. at 7.
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fectiveness. 66 Unfortunately, defining and identifying teacher effec-
tiveness also presents significant challenges. 67
Throughout the twentieth century, determining whether or not a
teacher was effective involved the purely subjective judgment of an
administrator. 68 A good teacher was thought to possess certain ob-
servable characteristics, such as an open mind, a positive attitude, pa-
tience, dedication, flexibility, and high expectations for her students.69
For years, administrators observed teachers and subjectively deter-
mined whether or not a teacher possessed these traits.70 Those obser-
vations formed the foundation of a teacher's evaluation. 71 But, over
recent decades, there has been a movement to both sophisticate these
subjective measures and introduce objective measures into evalua-
tions.72 More recently, observations have become much more specific
and comprehensive. 73 Research-based, multi-faceted observation
forms are now standard. 74 Modern observational tools, such as Char-
lotte Danielson's Framework for Teaching, have been subjected to
validation testing, pilot studies, and ongoing modifications. 75 The data
these tools generate is far more detailed and reliable than that pro-
duced by their predecessors. 76 Yet for many policymakers this data is
not enough.77
66. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 9 (noting that creation of "rigorous, transparent,
and fair evaluation systems for teachers" was a key criterion in the Race to the Top rubric).
67. See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., MET PROJECT: DANIELSON'S FRAMEWORK FOR
TEACHING FOR CLASSROOM OBSERVATIONS 3 (2010), available at http://metproject.orgre-
sources/Danielson %20FFT 10_29_10.pdf.
68. Cf Jonah E. Rockoff & Cecilia Speroni, Subjective and Objective Evaluations of Teacher
Effectiveness: Evidence from New York City, 18 LAB. ECON. 687, 688 & n.1 (2011).
69. 5 Traits of Effective Teachers, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
classified/jobs/chi-teaching-habits-education-careers-20111107,0,4183936.story.
70. Cf. Rockoff & Speroni, supra note 68, at 688 & n.1.
71. Cf id.
72. Cf. id. at 688. See also infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Rockoff & Speroni, supra note 68 (arguing for an evaluation system that
incorporates both subjective and objective observations of effectiveness).
74. See Aaron Pallas, Reasonable Doubt on Teacher Evaluation, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2012,
4:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/reasonable-doubt-on-
teacher-evaluation/2012/02/07/gIQACKuzxQ blog.html (noting that Charlotte Danielson's
Framework for Teaching (FFT) and Robert Pianta's Classroom Assessment Scoring System are
widely adopted observation tools, which involve highly detailed rubrics that assess observable
competencies across multiple categories); see also BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNI5., supra note
67, at 2 (noting the detail of the FF1 as an instrument of teacher evaluation).
75. See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 67, at 3.
76. See generally id.
77. See, e.g., Rockoff & Speroni, supra note 68, at 688.
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Identifying and increasing teacher effectiveness is a critical step to
increase student achievement in American public schools. 78 In 2006,
researchers at the Brookings Institution analyzed Los Angeles public
school data and concluded that teacher effectiveness was the strongest
predictor of individual student achievement. 79 In fact, the Brookings
Report determined that "having a top-quartile teacher rather than a
bottom-quartile teacher four years in a row would be enough to close
the black-white test score gap." 80 This significant finding has heavily
shaped education policy over the last several years.81
Several current themes in education reform can be traced to the
Brookings Report. The report lobbied for a "value-added" compo-
nent in teacher evaluation, merit pay for effective teachers, and tenure
reforms, each of which has created contentious debate among and be-
tween legislators, educators, and school administrators.8 2 Value-ad-
ded analysis is a particularly confusing and controversial method of
assessing teacher effectiveness.8 3 In essence, value-added analysis at-
tempts to isolate the effect a teacher has on an individual student's
achievement, as measured by standardized test scores.8 4 To complete
the analysis, statisticians look at an individual student's past standard-
ized test scores and use that information to predict the student's fu-
ture test scores.85 "The difference between the prediction and
students' actual scores each year is the estimated 'value' that the
teacher added-or subtracted. '8 6
Value-added analysis was a potentially groundbreaking tool for
measuring teacher effectiveness. 87 It is the only purely objective mea-
sure to date.88 Yet value-added analysis is a divisive concept. 89 Some
78. See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 67, at 4; see also WEISBERG ET AL., supra
note 13, at 3.
79. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, at 7-8; see also BARATZ-SNOWDEN, supra note 39, at 1
("Studies have shown that teacher quality is the most important in-school factor related to stu-
dent academic achievement.").
80. GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, at 8.
81. See BARATZ-SNOWDEN, supra note 39, at 1.
82. See infra notes 186-216 and accompanying text.
83. See Teresa Watanabe, LAUSD Tackles a Tough Formula, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at
Al; see also Jason Felch & Jason Song, Superintendent Spreads the Gospel of 'Value-Added'
Teacher Evaluations, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-
teacher-evall8-2009oct18,0,5822570,full.story.
84. Watanabe, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Cf Rockoff & Speroni, supra note 68, at 687-88. Prior to the development of value-added
analysis, teacher effectiveness was gauged through observations by administrators, requiring a
level of subjective judgment.
89. See Watanabe, supra note 83. But see Felch & Song, supra note 83.
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critics question the reliability of value-added analysis, given that a stu-
dent's standardized test score is influenced by several variables, of
which teacher effectiveness is merely one.90 These other factors in-
clude class size, curriculum, instructional time, resources, home and
community supports, health, attendance, peer culture, and prior edu-
cational experience, amongst others.91 Additional complications in-
volve factoring in additional variables, such as whether a student is an
English language learner or transferred schools in the middle of the
year. 92 Another criticism is that there is no universally accepted
formula with which to measure a teacher's effectiveness, and different
formulas produce different results.93
In addition, there are concerns about errors in the application of the
analysis. 94 In New York City, for example, some teachers found criti-
cal errors in their value-added reports: several teachers received
scores for students they had never met or subjects they never taught.95
Finally, even if value-added analysis were error free in both design
and application, it could not measure every teacher's effectiveness be-
cause most teachers in the United States teach subjects that are not
assessed via standardized tests.96
C. Race to the Top
Despite its many challenges and complications, value-added analy-
sis is now a prominent feature of teacher evaluation in several dis-
90. See Watanabe, supra note 83; see also Valerie Strauss, Getting Teacher Evaluation Right,
WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2011, 3:35 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/answer-sheet/post/
getting-teacher-evaluation-right/2011/09/15/gIQAPzs9UKjblog.html.
91. Strauss, supra note 90.
92. Watanabe, supra note 83. Perhaps even more concerning are the ethical and moral ques-
tions raised by the value-added analysis, such as whether race or poverty should be factored into
the formula. See id. Both demographic identifiers have been determined to "affect achieve-
ment," but not to "determine or predict it." Id.
93. Id.
94. The president of the Houston Federation of Teachers claims that the formulas are unrelia-
ble and difficult to communicate with teachers. Id. In fact, the general formula used in Houston
is the "linear mixed model," which consists of symbols and letters more than eighty characters
long and is considered doctorate-level math:
y = X? + Zv + ? where ? is a p-by-1 vector of fixed effects; X is an n-by-p matrix; v is a
q-by-1 vector of random effects; Z is an n-by-q matrix; E(v) = o, Var(v) = G; E(?) = o,
Var(?) = R; Cov(v,?) = o. V = Var(y) = Var(y - X?) = Var(Zv + ?) = ZGZT + R.
Id.
95. Id.
96. Andrew J. Rotherham, Rating Teachers: The Trouble with Value-Added Data, TIME (Sept.
23, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2020867,00.html#ixzzldvH75kZl.
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tricts. 97 Value-added analysis has also played a key role in Race to the
Top.98 Congress enacted Race to the Top as a component of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), 99 which
created a $4.35 billion fund for the program. 00 Race to the Top, a
competitive grant program, seeks to "encourage and reward States
that are creating the conditions for education innovation and reform
... in four core education reform areas."'' The objective given the
most weight in the federal rubric was whether a plan contained steps
to create "Great Leaders and Great Teachers. ' 10 2 To win Race to the
Top funds, a state had to create legislation to identify and improve
teacher effectiveness.10 3 Though Race to the Top guidelines do not
explicitly mention "value-added analysis," many state legislators de-
termined that a requirement to include some form of value-added
analysis was implicit. 04 Indeed, the criteria displayed a bias towards a
value-added model. 0 5 States were encouraged to take the following
actions:
(ii) Design and implement rigorous, transparent, and fair evalua-
tion systems for teachers and principals that (a) differentiate effec-
97. See Felch & Song, supra note 83. In addtion to Los Angeles and New York City, value-
added analysis has been used as a measure of teacher effectiveness in Houston, Texas; William-
son County, Tennessee; and across the state of North Carolina. Id.
98. See id.
99. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The "Overview of Program and Points" shows the distribution of points awarded to each
component of state plans. Id. at 3. A total of 500 points are available between six categories of
selection criteria and one priority. Id. One hundred and thirty-eight of these points are assigned
to the category entitled "Great Teachers and Great Leaders." Id. This means that nearly 28%
of the criteria related directly to a state's plan to assess and improve teacher effectiveness and to
use that data to equally distribute effective teachers. Id.
103. See id. Within the "Great Teachers and Great Leaders" category, the most highly priori-
tized element was identifying and improving teacher effectiveness:
D. Great Teachers and Leaders (138 points)
(D)(1) Providing high-quality pathways for aspiring teachers and principals (21
points)
(D)(2) Improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on performance (58points)
(D)(3) Ensuring equitable distribution of effective teachers and principals (25 points)
(D)(4) Improving the effectiveness of teacher and principal preparation programs (14
points)
(D)(5) Providing effective support to teachers and principals (20 points).
Id. (emphasis added).
104. Nearly all states competing for Race to the Top funds included some form of value-added
anlysis in their legislation. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, STATE OF THE STATES:
TRENDS AND EARLY LESSONS ON TEACHER EVALUATION AND EFFECTIVENESS POLICIES 5-8
(2011) [hereinafter NCTQ], available at www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq-stateOfThe
States.pdf.
105. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 9.
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tiveness using multiple rating categories that take into account data
on student growth (as defined in this notice) as a significant factor,
and (b) are designed and developed with teacher and principal in-
volvement;...
(iii) Conduct annual evaluations of teachers and principals that
include timely and constructive feedback; as part of such evalua-
tions, provide teachers and principals with data on student growth
for their students, classes, and schools .... 106
To secure Race to the Top funds, the legislation required states to
use teacher evaluations, including student growth data, to inform deci-
sions regarding compensation, retention, promotion, and tenure.10 7
The legislation also encouraged states to use these evaluations to re-
move ineffective teachers, both tenured and untenured, provided the
teachers were given ample time to improve their performance and the
removal decisions were "made using rigorous standards and stream-
lined, transparent, and fair procedures." 108 Thus, in order to win the
"Race," states had to create evaluation policies that complied with
due process requirements.' 0 9
III. ANALYSIS
The historically inadequate process of teacher evaluation has indis-
putably created an established practice of treating teachers as
equivalent, interchangeable parts, rather than individual professionals
with varying levels of competence and expertise. 110 This Part argues
that, despite the prevalence of meaningless evaluation procedures, the
ample evidence demonstrates that states, by working in concert with
teacher leadership and school administration, can create legislation
that values teacher effectiveness while honoring due process rights.111
This Part provides an analysis of due process rights related to teacher
evaluation and argues that inadequate evaluation policies, rather than
the tenure system, have prevented efficient removal of ineffective
teachers.112 Next, this Part evaluates recent state efforts to improve
teacher evaluation systems while preserving due process rights.' 13 Fi-
nally, this Part synthesizes the lessons of recent state legislation and
offers recommendations for future education policy." 4
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 115-46 and accompanying text.
110. WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 2.
111. See infra notes 124-53 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 115-46 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 154-216 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 223-68 and accompanying text.
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A. Due Process and the Myth of Lifetime Employment
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from depriving individuals of "life, liberty or property without
due process of law."1 15 The Supreme Court has determined that this
clause contains both substantive and procedural elements: "[T]he Due
Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty,
and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally
adequate procedures."' 1 6 Substantive due process protects individuals
from arbitrary and irrational government actions, regardless of
whether the procedure used is fair.117 Procedural due process, on the
other hand, guarantees individuals an appropriate procedure prior to
government deprivation of a protected interest in life, liberty, or prop-
erty. 18 In the case of procedural due process, the deprivation is per-
mitted so long as it is affected in accordance with sufficiently accurate
and trustworthy procedures. 119
The right to procedural due process stems from the possession of a
protected interest and protects that interest from erroneous govern-
ment deprivation.12 0 Specifically, states create a property interest in
public employment when legislation entitles an employee to maintain
employment during satisfactory performance and specifies a criteria
and procedure for dismissal. 21 Tenure provisions, which are codified
by most states, create a property interest by (1) guaranteeing employ-
ment to teachers who receive satisfactory ratings and fulfill other stat-
utory obligations (the substantive right) and (2) specifying criteria and
procedures for dismissal when performance is unsatisfactory (the pro-
cedural right).' 22 It follows, then, that a tenured teacher is entitled to
procedural due process if the state, or its agent (a school district),
seeks to deprive that teacher of her property right in employment. 123
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
117. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
118. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542.
119. See id. at 542-43.
120. Id. at 541-42.
121. See id. at 538-42.
122. See MICHEAL IMBER & TYLL VAN GEEL, A TEACHER'S GUIDE TO EDUCATION LAW 221
(3d ed. 2005).
123. Id. In contrast, a property interest is not definitively created for probationary or non-
tenured teachers. Id. As a result of a state or district practice of continued employment an
interest may be implied, but the teacher would bear the burden of proving that she has a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement to continued employment. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972).
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Despite the widespread public misconception that tenure provisions
grant teachers lifetime employment, the creation of a property inter-
est and the corresponding right to procedural due process does not
guarantee such an entitlement. 124 The existence of such an interest
merely guarantees the tenured teacher the right to a procedure, which
ensures that her school district does not deprive her of that interest
without justification. 125 In fact, as states create the property interest
through tenure provisions, they simultaneously create the procedure
by which a school district can deprive a teacher of those interests. 126
B. How Much Process Is Due?
The scope of procedure, and the confusion surrounding it, has cre-
ated the conditions under which the misconceptions about tenure
have thrived.127 The Supreme Court ruled that to determine what
type of process is due, a court must balance competing interests: the
private interest in the property against the public interest in the depri-
vation.128 Regarding dismissal of a teacher, the balancing test com-
pares the private interest of the teacher in maintaining employment
against the public interests of providing effective public education and
minimizing administrative burdens.12 9 An additional factor, the risk
of erroneous deprivation, also weighs into the analysis.130
The essential principle of procedural due process is that deprivation
of life, liberty, or property must be preceded by notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing that is tailored to the interests at stake.1 31 The
Supreme Court has consistently recognized the interest in maintaining
employment as a significant and carefully guarded property inter-
est. 132 Thus, the opportunity for a hearing must be tailored to this
interest. Also, because dismissals for cause often involve factual dis-
124. Zirkel, supra note 8.
125. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542.
126. See NCTQ, supra note 104, at 23-27 (demonstrating that most states create procedures
for dismissal in tandem with tenure policies).
127. See generally Zirkel, supra note 8 (asserting that the widely accepted idea that tenure
guarantees lifetime employment is a myth).
128. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-43 (1985); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
343-48 (1976) (noting that in its analysis a court must also consider the value and cost of more
accurate procedures).
129. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-43.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 542.
132. See id. at 543 ("[T]he significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot
be gainsaid. We have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of
livelihood. While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time
and is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which he left his previous
job." (citations omitted)).
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putes, it is critical that a teacher is permitted to present her side of the
dispute. 133 Thus, an oral, pre-termination hearing is appropriate. 134
The government's interest in expedient termination does not out-
weigh these private interests.135 According to the Supreme Court,
providing an employee the opportunity to respond prior to termina-
tion imposes neither a significant administrative burden nor an intol-
erable delay.136 In addition, a pre-termination hearing has the benefit
of reducing the risk of erroneous deprivation. 37 Thus, when the gov-
ernment seeks to dismiss a teacher on grounds of incompetence, due
process includes notice and the opportunity for an oral, pre-termina-
tion hearing. 38
Accordingly, most states with tenure provisions have developed
procedures that ensure both notice and a hearing for tenured teachers
facing dismissal. 139 Additionally, nearly all of these states afford a pe-
riod of remediation-an opportunity for poorly performing teachers
to improve through professional development. Remediation serves
several purposes. 140 First, it minimizes the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion by providing an opportunity for performance improvement and a
corresponding review of the grounds for dismissal.' 41 It also protects
a school district's investment in an employee by allowing an exper-
ienced teacher to remain and improve. 142 This benefit is even more
valuable when the teacher has the imminent threat of termination as
an added motivation to improve her practice. However, the most im-
portant function of the remediation period, in terms of due process
protections, is that it provides administrators with additional time to
133. Id.
134. See id. at 542-43.
135. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544.
136. See id. ("[A]ffording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would
impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable delays."). But see Brill, supra
note 3. The "rubber room" was a holding tank for New York City teachers accused of incompe-
tence or misconduct. Id. Some teachers allegedly sat, suspended with pay, in the rubber room
for up to three years awaiting their pre-termination hearing. Id. While the article details the
economic ramifications of paying teachers who do not actually teach, it fails to discuss the source
of the delay or discuss why the hearings have not already occurred. See id. at 30-36.
137. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544.
138. Id. at 543-44.
139. See NCTQ, supra note 104, at 23-25.
140. Id.
141. Cf Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544.
142. Cf. id. ("[U]ntil the matter is settled, the employer would continue to receive the benefit
of the employee's labors. It is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a new
one.").
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collect evidence that could be used to support a termination
decision.14 3
Despite media claims that suggest otherwise, the process due to
teachers facing dismissal is entirely practicable. If a teacher is charged
with incompetence, the government has a valid interest in seeking her
dismissal-the government must ensure that students have access to
quality instruction. Once it is established that a teacher is ineffective
and should therefore be dismissed, the school district needs only to
provide the teacher with notice of the grounds for its determination
and an opportunity for her to respond. 144 However, if the state has
enhanced its dismissal procedures in any way, such as by requiring a
remediation period, then it must substantially comply with its own
procedures.145 If the district has met this burden, it has satisfied due
process requirements and has, from a procedural standpoint, justified
dismissal. 146
Given this entirely manageable burden and the increasing preva-
lence of stories of teacher incompetence, it is perplexing that so few
teachers have been dismissed. But the source of this problem is not
the much maligned tenure system, the advocacy and protections of
teachers unions, or the burdensome procedural requirements. In-
stead, the reason that so few teachers have been dismissed for incom-
petence is that so few teachers have been rated as incompetent. 147
"For example, a study in eastern Pennsylvania revealed that over
90[%] of the administrators gave teachers perfect ratings .... ,,148 In
Toledo public schools, only three out of over a thousand teachers re-
ceived an unsatisfactory rating.1 49 In Chicago public schools, which
uses a four-tiered rating system, still only four-tenths of a single per-
cent of teachers were rated as unsatisfactory.1 50
143. See Joseph Beckham, Education Law Into Practice: Ten Judicial "Commandments" for
Legally Sound Teacher Evaluation, 117 EDUC. L. REP. 435, 438 (West 1997) ("Evidence that a
teacher failed to follow a reasonable plan of remediation or refused to follow a plan designed to
correct performance deficiencies might reflect neglect of duty or insubordination as a basis for
an adverse employment decision.").
144. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542.
145. Judges have adopted a "substantial compliance" standard when determining whether dis-
tricts complied with their own evaluation and dismissal policies. Beckham, supra note 143, at
435; see also Powell v. Bd. of Educ., 545 N.E.2d 767 (111. App. Ct. 1989); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
643 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio 1994); Phillis v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 617 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992).
146. See Zirkel, supra note 44, at 6-10 (asserting that courts typically defer to the decisions of
school districts, rather than substitute their own judgment for that of education experts).
147. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
148. Zirkel, supra note 44, at 3.
149. WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 11.
150. Id. Though one might hope that teacher evaluation systems that utilize a broader range
of ratings would more accurately reflect the performance differences among teachers, this has
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These facts demonstrate the difficulty in dismissing ineffective
teachers. "Not surprisingly, the number of teachers terminated as a
result of performance evaluation is ...negligible. 1' 51 This uncon-
scionable practice preserves the problem of undervaluing teacher
quality and prevents districts from improving instructional effective-
ness-resulting in a devastating loss of opportunity for students.152 In
addition, this systemic failure to offer evidence of teacher incompe-
tence has led to the characterization of dismissal decisions as arbitrary
and capricious.' 53 To remedy this failure, and to offer all students the
opportunities created by a quality education, policy surrounding
teacher evaluation demands comprehensive reform.
C. Post-Race Efforts to Meet Due Process Burdens and
Increase Teacher Effectiveness
Initial state efforts following Race to the Top offer hope that refor-
mation is underway-elevating the teaching profession and ensuring
access to high-quality public education for all students. However, the
experiences of one state offer a cautionary tale of how efforts to im-
prove teacher accountability and evaluation policies can be under-
mined by unnecessary, unmanageable administrative burdens and
premature reliance on objective measures of effectiveness that may
not ultimately be reliable.
1. Winning the Race? Tennessee's "Prize"
Though a few states had already created new legislation regarding
teacher evaluation, Race to the Top was certainly an impetus for
change. 154 Thirty-three states have changed teacher evaluation poli-
cies following Race to the Top's enactment in 2009.155 The states that
not been the case. Id. Even when administrators are given multiple ratings to choose from,
evaluators in several districts rated the majority of teachers in the highest category, instead of
reserving that category for teachers who consistently outperform their peers. Id. This evalua-
tion inflation proves that the Widget Effect has been equally coercive in districts using four or
more ratings as in those using only two. See id. More importantly, virtually no teachers are
identified as ineffective instructors. Id.
151. Zirkel, supra note 44, at 3; see also WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 22 (noting that
even among admininstrators who reported receiving "very extensive" training in how to conduct
an evaluation, "only 36[%] have recommended dismissal of a tenured teacher for poor instruc-
tion in the last five years").
152. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 2.
153. See id. at 30.
154. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 5.
155. Rebecca Harris, New Teacher Evaluation Takes Step Forward, CATALYST CHI. (Oct. 26,
2011), http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2011/10/26/new-teacher-evaluation-takes-step-
forward.
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created the most aggressive and specific plans for teacher evaluation
ultimately won the Race to the Top and secured federal funds.1 56
Tennessee and Delaware, ranked first and second respectively, were
awarded Race to the Top funding.157 Both states created legislation
demanding that teacher evaluations: (1) include objective evidence of
student learning; (2) are significantly informed by student achieve-
ment; (3) use student achievement as the preponderant criterion; and
(4) lead to dismissal for teachers with poor evaluations.' '158
Education Secretary Arne Duncan praised Tennessee's legislation
(named the Tennessee First to the Top Act of 2010), stating that Ten-
nessee had the courage and commitment to improve outcomes for stu-
dents.1 59 Tennessee even created a new state motto, "First to the
Top.' 160 In accordance with the Race to the Top rubric, Tennessee
enacted aggressive legislation to address teacher quality through
highly detailed, high-stakes evaluation procedures that left little im-
plementation discretion to local education agencies.161 Under the new
legislation, evaluations were based on two components: (1) student
test scores and (2) frequent principal observations. 162 Of all the states
that enacted new legislation to secure Race to the Top funding, Ten-
nessee developed the most labor-intensive teacher evaluation plan, re-
quiring six annual observations for probationary (non-tenured)
teachers. 163 These observations, along with other subjective criteria,
comprise 50% of a teacher's comprehensive evaluation.1 64 The other
50% of the evaluation is based primarily on objective measures of stu-
dent achievement. 65 Thirty-five percent of this achievement score
must rely on student growth data, which is based on standardized test
156. See Delaware and Tennessee Win First Race to the Top Grants, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Mar.
29, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/delaware-and-tennessee-win-first-race-top-
grants; see also NCTQ, supra note 104, at 16-19; Nine States and the District of Columbia Win
Second Round Race to the Top Grants, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/
news/press-releases/nine-states-and-district-columbia-win-second-round-race-top-grants.
157. Delaware and Tennessee Win First Race to the Top Grants, supra note 156, at 6-7 fig.1.
158. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 6-7. Using student achievement or growth as the preponder-
ant criterion in teacher evaluations proved to be a less popular provision, with only thirteen out
of the thirty-three states including such a measure in their legislation. Id.
159. Michael Winerip, In Tennessee, Following the Rules for Evaluations Off a Cliff, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at A18.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See NCTQ, supra note 104, at 13 (demonstrating that Tennessee's frequent evaluations
are excessive in comparison to most other states that enacted post-Race to the Top legislation,
with nearly all other states requiring three or fewer observations).
164. Id. at 16.
165. Id.
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scores from the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System. 166 The
remaining 15% must be based on other measures of achievement data
selected from a list of options created by the state.167
Unfortunately, only a year after Tennessee received the award,
many Tennessee educators and administrators felt that winning may
not have been such a prize.168 Implementation of Tennessee First to
the Top created pervasive, counterproductive problems in teacher
evaluation, simultaneously overwhelming administrators and demor-
alizing teachers.1 69 At Blackman Middle School, for example, the
principal said that his job changed entirely after the legislation
passed.170 In Tennessee, principals bear the sole responsibility for
conducting teacher observations and evaluations. 171 Instead of spend-
ing time supporting and coaching teachers each day in the classroom,
he spent his days engaged in the various procedures and paperwork
connected to the evaluations. 72 In addition, he had to spend the same
amount of time observing his strongest teachers as he did supporting
his weakest. 173 According to the Blackman principal, the new obser-
vation and evaluation practice is "an insult to [his] best teachers" and
"also a terrible waste of time."'1 74
Further complicating the new evaluation system was the student
achievement component. Modeled on value-added analysis and reli-
ant on standardized test scores, the new system had several holes, the
most perplexing of which was that many Tennessee teachers did not
teach students or subjects that produced standardized test scores.175
Students in kindergarten through third grade were not tested at all,
nor were the subjects of art, music, and various vocations, which left
166. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1-302(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2012); NCTQ, supra note 104, at 16
(comparing Tennessee's legislation to that of New York and Washington D.C.).
167. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1-302(d)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2012); NCTQ, supra note 104, at 16.
168. See Winerip, supra note 159.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 32. Compare Tennessee's requirement to other states, which
allow broader discretion to local education agencies to determine who can complete observa-
tions and evaluations. Id. Florida allows the broadest discretion, stating only that "[t]he individ-
ual responsible for supervising the teacher" is responsible for conducting teacher observations
and evaluations. Id. Tennessee, in contrast, delegates little discretionary authority, mandating
that principals create all evaluation data. Id.
172. See Winerip, supra note 159. The Blackman principal is required to complete a minimum
of four annual observations for each of the sixty-five teachers at his school. Id. Each individual
observation requires over two hours of work: fifty minutes on the actual observation and an
additional eighty minutes to comply with the procedural and reporting requirements, including
pre- and post-observations and a scoring rubric. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id.
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more than half of Tennessee's teachers without any relationship to the
standardized test scores in the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment
System.1 76 To compensate, the state created an additional set of as-
sessment rules.177 These rules permitted teachers without a direct
match to test scores to choose the subject test that they wanted to be
judged on and this score became 15% of their overall evaluation
score.' 78 As a result, teachers played the odds, guessing which subject
would deliver the best scores. 179 Unsurprisingly, morale at Blackman
and many other Tennessee schools plummeted as Tennessee raced to
be First to the Top.180
These observations, scores, and the resulting comprehensive evalua-
tion became the high-stakes data upon which employment decisions
were made,' 8 ' including eligibility for tenure, promotion, and dismis-
sal. 182 In Tennessee, which ranks teachers in one of four tiers of effec-
tiveness,18 3 teachers must teach for five years and be ranked in the
highest two tiers for at least two of those years before they are eligible
for tenure. 184 Probationary teachers are consistently eligible for dis-
missal. 185 Tenured teachers, however, are eligible to be returned to
probationary status, and therefore eligible for dismissal, after receiv-
ing two consecutive years of ratings that show performance below or
significantly below expectations. 18 6
2. Lessons from Other States
Fortunately, the experiences of other states that enacted post-Race
legislation offer hope for meaningful improvements to public educa-
tion.. These experiences can be synthesized to create guidelines and
best practices for future policy related to teacher effectiveness.
Nearly all states that passed post-Race legislation have taken steps to
eliminate the conditions that created the Widget Effect.1 87 Instead of
binary, all-or-nothing ratings systems in which teachers were classified
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Winerip, supra note 159.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-503 (Supp. 2012).
182. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 23-27.
183. Id. at 20.
184. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-503.
185. See NCTQ, supra note 104, at 25; cf Winerip, supra note 159.
186. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 25.
187. See id. at ii (noting that thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have made changes
to their evaluation policy since 2008, and that these evaluations are being used to identify and
increase teacher effectiveness).
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as either effective or ineffective, all but two states have modified their
ratings to better approximate and illustrate the range of competencies
for teachers. 188 Most of these states have broadened their range of
teacher evaluation performance levels, with four levels being the most
common. 189 "Multiple, distinct rating options.., allow administrators
to precisely describe and compare differences in instructional per-
formance" and also allow teachers room and motivation to improve
their practice. 190
In accordance with more sophisticated evaluation categories, states
have also created more specific and rigorous observation protocols for
teachers and administrators. 191 Each state that competed for Race to
the Top funds mandated a minimum of one annual observation for
probationary teachers. 192 Eleven out of the eighteen states surveyed
require two or more annual observations.1 93 Washington D.C. re-
quires five observations while Rhode Island requires four, two of
which are shorter, unannounced classroom visits. 194 Tennessee is a
noted outlier, requiring six annual observations.1 95 All other states
required three or less observations or evaluations. 196 Multiple obser-
vations allow administrators to discern the strengths and weaknesses
of human capital in their building and form a more reliable foundation
for a summative evaluation.1 97 With this information, administrators
can provide teachers with frequent feedback, which gives them notice
of their perceived performance and provides differentiated targets for
improvement. 198 Frequent observations also allow administrators to
188. See id. at 20. Idaho and Louisiana maintained a limited rating scale of proficient or
unsatisfactory and effective or ineffective, respectively. Id. at 20 fig.6. However, legislation draft
materials indicate that Louisiana is creating additional ratings categories. Id. at 20 n.23.
189. See id. Only Oklahoma has five categories: superior, highly effective, effective, needs
improvement, and ineffective. Id. at 20 fig.6.
190. WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 27.
191. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 17-19 fig.5.
192. Id. at 13 fig.3 & n.18.
193. Id. at 13 fig.3. The number of annual observations required may actually be higher than
described. See id. at 13 n.18. Some states use "evaluations" and "observations" interchangeably,
but allude to the fact that multiple observations will inform summative, end-of-'ear evaluations.
Id. As a result, some of the states that are credited as requiring only one annual observation
may, in reality, require one summative evaluation that is informed by multiple observations in
one year. Id.
194. Id. at 13 fig.3.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. "Observation" typically refers to a discrete time period during which an evaluator
watches an educator teach a lesson. See WEISBERO ET AL., supra note 13, at 20-21. An evalua-
tion is the sum of data including these observations and any other information mandated by the
state or adopted by the district. See id.
198. Cf. id. at 10.
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identify real threats of incompetence and create remediation plans or
prepare for dismissal procedures. 199
States have also taken steps to ensure that teachers are judged, at
least in part, on their contribution to academic growth of their stu-
dents.200 In 2009, only fifteen states used some form of objective evi-
dence of student learning in teacher evaluation. 201 Following Race to
the Top, twenty-three states now use value-added analysis or another
form of objective evidence of student learning to inform evalua-
tions.20 2 Additionally, evidence of student achievement is the prepon-
derant criterion in teacher evaluations in twelve states and
Washington D.C., as opposed to only four states prior to the Race. 203
Experimentation with value-added data has proven that it can be a
useful supplement in the performance evaluation of a narrow class of
teachers.204 However, the lesson from Tennessee demonstrates that
using value-added analysis effectively and fairly requires care.205 Re-
quiring value-added analysis to be the preponderant criterion upon
which teacher evaluations are determined could undermine the goal
of increasing accountability, as it has in Tennessee.
Several states require a remediation period for teachers who receive
ratings that determine they are ineffective.206 Some states differenti-
ate between remediation policies for probationary and tenured teach-
ers.20 7 Colorado, for example, mandates that all teachers rated as
ineffective must be provided with the opportunity to improve.20 8
Only tenured teachers, however, are entitled to a formal remediation
plan, with mandated professional development opportunities and a
"reasonable" time to improve. 20 9 This discretionary language requires
Colorado districts to engage in improvement efforts for struggling
teachers, but also permits flexibility in formatting the specifications of
the remediation program at the district level. This approach both
meets the standards of fundamental fairness guaranteed by procedural
199. See id. at 26-30.
200. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 16.
201. Id. at ii.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 8 fig.2.
204. WEISBERO ET AL., supra note 13, at 27.
205. See supra notes 159-85 and accompanying text (describing Tennessee's predicament with
requiring value-added data in teacher evaluations for teachers who do not teach subjects or
students addressed by formal, state assessments).
206. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 23-25 fig.9.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 23 fig.9.
209. Id. at 25.
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due process 210 and limits the negative impact of instructional
incompetence.
Many states have taken a hard stance on incompetence, explicitly
permitting, and in one case demanding, efficient dismissal of ineffec-
tive teachers.211 States have also taken deliberate efforts to stream-
line evaluation and dismissal procedures. 212 Both Indiana and New
York have included explicit provisions in their legislation to minimize
the length of time an ineffective teacher can remain on the payroll and
in the classroom. 213 In Indiana, a teacher must appeal a dismissal de-
cision to the local school board, which then has thirty days to reach a
decision. 214 The board's decision is final.215 In New York, the local
school board may charge teachers or principals with two consecutive
ineffective ratings as incompetent and consider those teachers or prin-
cipals for termination through an expedited hearing process. 216
D. Recommendations to Respect Students, Teachers, and
Procedural Due Process
The lessons of post-Race legislation lead to several recommenda-
tions for future legislation. First, states should eschew binary rating
scales and adopt teacher evaluation policies that contain a multi-tiered
rating system.2 17 Multiple observations by trained evaluators, includ-
ing administrators and peer reviewers, should provide the evidentiary
foundation of summative evaluations, 218  and evidence of student
achievement should supplement this data.219 Once evaluations are es-
tablished as reliable, they must matter: evaluations should inform all
critical employment decisions, including dismissal and awards of ten-
ure.220 Finally, information gathered from evaluations should be used
210. Cf Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1984).
211. See NCTQ, supra note 104, at 23-25 fig.9 (noting that Colorado, Delaware, the District
of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, and Tennessee all explicitly mention in their legislation that teacher ineffective-
ness is grounds for dismissal). Rhode Island and Oklahoma have the most aggressive legislation
regarding dismissal of ineffective educators, as they are the only states to explicitly require that
districts dismiss all educators who are rated ineffective for two or more years. Id. at 25.
212. Id. at 26.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 10-11.
218. See TNTP, supra note 34, at 5.
219. See id. at 7-8.
220. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 8.
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to determine individualized plans for professional development. 221
When that development plan has failed to transform a poorly per-
forming teacher into an effective teacher, states must require dismissal
while providing the teacher adequate procedural protections. 222
1. Multi-Tiered Ratings Systems
To recognize the range of abilities and talents in the teacher
workforce, each state should adopt a multi-tiered rating system as a
component of its evaluation system. In addition to providing notice to
teachers of their standing with the administration, multi-tiered ratings
provide critical differentiation of skills and ability to administrators
and teachers.2 23 A five-category rating scale, such as the one devel-
oped in Oklahoma, 224 can identify highly effective teachers, yet truly
reward superior teachers by classifying them with an elite status. This
knowledge can be used to identify teachers for career-enhancing and
capacity-building opportunities. 225 Once identified, these elite teach-
ers can serve as instructional leaders, lead professional development
or remediation plans, and mentor new or struggling teachers. 226
2. Annual Summative Evaluations Using Data from Multiple
Sources
The multi-tiered ratings mentioned above should be incorporated
into annual, summative teacher evaluations. Annual evaluations are
"the only way to ensure that all teachers... get the ongoing feedback
on their performance that all professionals deserve. '227 These evalua-
tions should be based primarily on observations, yet should be de-
signed to ensure a manageable administrative burden. The
experiences of the administrators in Tennessee illustrate an impracti-
cal burden.228 Six annual observations is excessive and impossible to
complete when principals-the only individuals tasked with this re-
sponsibility-are required to go through the cumbersome formal ob-
servation procedures of pre- and post-observation conferences and
221. See NCTQ, supra note 104, at 35 ("Teacher evaluation policy should reflect the purpose
of helping all teachers improve, not just low-performers.").
222. WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 30.
223. See id. at 27.
224. See NCTQ, supra note 104, at 20 fig.6 (naming Oklahoma's five teacher ratings-"supe-
rior, highly effective, effective, needs improvement and ineffective").
225. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 29.
226. Id.
227. THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, TEACHER EVALUATION 2.0, at 4 (2010), available at http://
tntp.org/assets/documents/Teacher-Evaluation-OctlOF.pdf.
228. See Winerip, supra note 159.
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rubrics for each observation.229 Instead, multiple observations by
multiple observers should be performed annually. Each observation
need not result in a formal evaluation, thus eliminating the excessive
paperwork.230 However, each observation should result in data that
can be used to inform a summative evaluation.231
3. Multiple Observers
This leads to a third recommendation: engage multiple observers in
the process of evaluation. In addition to principals, evaluators could
be other administrators in the building, district employees that spe-
cialize in evaluation, or coaches or consulting teachers with a vested
interest in increasing instructional capacity.232 A rating formed with
feedback from multiple data sources, including input from multiple
observers, evidence of student growth, and parent and student feed-
back, reduces the risk of a personal or political opinion influencing
ratings. 233 Such a model also minimizes the burden on administra-
tors.234 To accommodate multiple observers, states should ensure that
districts create clear and rigorous expectations that reflect effective-
ness in the classroom.235 These expectations should leave little room
for inference to ensure uniform implementation from various observ-
ers and to eliminate the risk of an arbitrary or capricious rating.236
Accordingly, districts should create or utilize definitive tools, such as
the Danielson Framework for Teaching, to assist observers in consist-
ently evaluating teachers against these standards.237 Finally, districts
should provide extensive training to all evaluators to ensure capability
and consistency. 238
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. This data could take the form of a simple rubric, used to rate a teacher's lesson on a
numeric scale. In accordance with the notice requirement of due process, this standardized ru-
bric should be made available to teachers well in advance of the observation.
232. See, e.g., BARATZ-SNOWDEN, supra note 39, at 22 (noting that, in the intern program
instituted by the Toledo Federation of Teachers, new teachers worked with "a consulting teacher
whose responsibility it [was] to evaluate their progress and assist them in acquiring the skills and
knowledge necessary for meeting the performance standards of the Toledo Public Schools").
233. See NCTQ, supra note 104, at 35.
234. Cf Winerip, supra note 159.
235. See, e.g., In re Meyer, 581 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921-22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (providing an
example of clearly defined evaluation criteria supporting a disciplinary decision). In In re Meyer,
the court upheld discipline for ineffective lesson plans because the evaluation criteria clearly
demanded effective lesson plans and the evidence showed that Meyer did not comply. Id.
236. THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 227, at 4.
237. See TNTP, supra note 34, at 2.
238. See id. at 8: cf Beckham, supra note 143, at 435.
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4. Use Only Reliable Objective Student Growth Data
Observational data must form the foundation of summative evalua-
tions, taking into account student growth data as a supplemental com-
ponent. When the data is reliable and used with caution, the measure
of student achievement could be informed by a value-added analy-
siS.2 3 9 As previously established, value-added models apply to only "a
minority of teachers, those in annual testing grades and subjects in
elementary and middle schools. ' 240 In addition, instances of mis-
guided and inappropriate use of value-added information have caused
public outcry.241 Substantial research shows that value-added scores
derived solely from annual standardized tests can demonstrate only a
certain correlation to, rather than causation of, teacher effectiveness,
which presents a question of accuracy in the ultimate evaluation.2 42
For this reason, states should be wary of significant reliance on value-
added data as the essential component of teacher evaluation.2 43 Fur-
ther, decisions made on the basis of these evaluations alone are likely
to be characterized as arbitrary and capricious, and fail to meet stan-
dards of due process.2 44 Additionally, while it may be somewhat relia-
ble in identifying the effectiveness of teachers "on the margins of the
performance spectrum," value-added analysis has proven "less relia-
ble in differentiating among teachers in the middle ranges of
performance." 245
This does not mean that value-added analysis must be discounted
entirely. In fact, sophistication in value-added analysis has allowed
researchers to identify "teachers that consistently achieve significant
growth with the most disadvantaged students, while similar students
fail to make progress with other teachers. '246 When its reliability is
established over time, this valuable information about teacher effec-
tiveness can be used to retain and increase talent. However, value-
added analysis is merely one component of objective student data,
which should also include summative assessments, 247 progress in the
239. See TNTP, supra note 34, at 4-5 (claiming that value-added analysis has a strong correla-
tion with a teacher's long-term success, as illustrated by consistently high standardized test
scores).
240. WEISBERO ET AL., supra note 13, at 27.
241. See Felch & Song, supra note 83; Watanabe, supra note 83.
242. See TNTP, supra note 34, at 5.
243. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 27.
244. See id. at 30.
245. Id. at 27.
246. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 2-3.
247. Summative assessments refer to assessments that measure a student's level of knowledge
following a complete unit of instruction, usually completion of a grade level. See NWEA, FOR
EVERY CHILD, MULTIPLE MEASURES: WHAT PARENTS AND EDUCATORS WANT FROM K-12 As-
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curriculum, random sampling of student work, and classroom observa-
tions "focused on a set of observable standards that gauge student
learning. '248 In contrast to the narrow scope of value-added analysis,
comprehensive objective student data can be used to observe the im-
pact of all teachers on student growth. 249
In determining parameters of objective student data, states should
be cautioned that insisting on rigid comparability measures of all
teachers could undermine evaluation efforts, regardless of grade or
subject taught.250 Instead, the focus should be on fair and valid mea-
sures of student growth, differentiated as necessary for specialty sub-
jects or untested grades or populations. 251 Variance in measures
based on the subject matter taught by the teacher is desirable. 252
Developing objective student data measures in certain subjects or
for teachers not accounted for by value-added models remains a ma-
jor challenge for states, yet several options are available. 253 Delaware
is attempting to isolate student growth in various subjects and grade
levels by using a pre-assessment and post-assessment model.254 These
assessments are sourced from a bank of commercially produced and
validated, teacher-made assessments. 255 Florida, in contrast, is using
item banks to assess grades or subjects without test scores. 256 Other
states, such as Rhode Island, are developing student learning objec-
tives (SLOs). 257 SLOs are achievement goals that are set for students
based on analysis of available state and local measures. 258 Used ap-
SESSMENTS 3 (2012), available at http://www.grunwald.com/pdfs/NWEA-GRUNWALDAssess-
mentPerceptionsb.pdf. Standardized tests are one form of summative assessments, but there
are many others, including unit tests and nationally normed computerized assessments that are
increasing in popularity. See id.; see also Computer-Based Adaptive Assessments, Nw. EVALUA-
TION Ass'N, http://www.nwea.org/products-services/assessments (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
Northwest Evaluation Association (NWEA) assessments are computer-based assessments that
students take three times per school year. Computer-Based Adaptive Assessments, supra note
247. The scores offer data about the student's individual growth over time and in comparison to
peers nationwide. Id. NWEA is used in many districts, including Chicago public schools. Press
Release, Chi. Pub. Schs., Board Approves Proposal to Adopt NWEA District-Wide as More
Rigorous and Accurate Measurement of Student Growth (Feb. 22, 2012), available at http://
www.cps.edu/News/Press-releases/Pages/02_22_2012_PR2.aspx.
248. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 3.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 29.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 29.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 30.
258. Id.
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propriately, SLOs can provide meaningful benchmarks by which to
gauge the effectiveness of teachers. Regardless of the measures used,
data on student achievement is clearly a crucial component of a mean-
ingful and reliable teacher evaluation.
E. Ensure that Evaluations Count
To reap sustained support from all stakeholders and truly contribute
to the elevation of the teaching profession, the evaluation process
must have meaningful implications-both positive and negative. 259
Because evaluations provide an evidentiary basis of excellence and
incompetence, they should inform all critical employment decisions
and opportunities.260
First, information gathered from evaluations should be used to de-
termine individualized professional development plans to foster tal-
ents and improve weaknesses. 261 In fact, the primary function of
evaluation systems must be to use the collected data to increase
teacher effectiveness. 262 A highly effective evaluation system must
contain a dynamic system to deliver individualized professional devel-
opment to all teachers, including those deemed highly effective.263
Furthermore, evaluations should be used to advance truly superior
teachers into leadership roles. Elite teachers should be compensated
for these leadership roles, rather than rewarded for their achievement
of an elite evaluation rating.264 In a leadership role, elite teachers add
value school- or district-wide by enhancing the instructional effective-
ness of other teachers through their specialized knowledge and ability.
Additional compensation, recognition, and career advancement will
help reward and retain highly effective teachers that might be tempted
to leave the classroom or the profession due to lack of advancement
opportunities. 265
This compensation model can be contrasted with merit pay, in
which teachers are rewarded for exceptional performance, tradition-
259. THE NEw TEACHER PROJECr, supra note 227, at 8.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. Teacher evaluations should offer ongoing feedback to a teacher so that she can im-
prove her practice and grow professionally. Id. A parallel can be the established best practice in
teaching of providing students with ongoing feedback about their performance and academic
growth. See id.
263. See id. at 9.
264. See Boris Korsunsky, Unexpected Benefits: A Defense of Teacher Tenure, EDUC. WEEK
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.edweek.orgltm/articles/2011/10/05/fpkorsunsky.html?tkn=RQSvD7%
v2BvsPD7LRYCCbeWUGcDDdgGbwyy%2FLeWS&intc=es.
265. Id.
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ally due to above-average gains in standardized test scores. 266 Though
merit pay is likely effective in retaining exceptional educators, its ben-
efits to students are narrow.2 67 The pay is delivered after the high
scores are received, and although it is reasonable to assume that a
teacher who has delivered high scores in the past will deliver high
scores in the future, her immense value is added only to the fortunate
students she teaches. By leveraging exceptional teachers' talents to
improve the instructional effectiveness of other teachers, the value of
her skills is multiplied and the benefit to student achievement is am-
plified.268 The administration can recognize teachers as valuable in-
structional assets and reward them appropriately, while also allowing
them to remain in the classroom where their talents can continue to
influence and elevate student achievement. As an added bonus, this
model creates the opportunity for highly effective teachers such as pri-
mary, arts, or special education teachers, whose value is not validated
by test scores, to be leveraged and valued as instructional leaders.
Finally, evaluations must matter when they reveal that a teacher is
ineffective. When a teacher has failed to improve her practice
through a path of professional development in accordance with the
statutory requirements of remediation, states must require expedient
dismissal. With an effective evaluation system, districts can provide
teachers with adequate notice and procedure in accordance with due
process, and students with effective instruction and access to
opportunity.
IV. IMPACT
When the high-quality, reliable, and manageable teacher evaluation
systems described in this Comment become standard practice, public
education will be transformed. Teachers will possess critical informa-
tion about their performance, which creates opportunity for improve-
ment. School districts will use this same information to offer
professional development to make effective teachers even more suc-
cessful, and to efficiently and respectfully remove incompetent teach-
ers. Finally, with meaningful evaluation systems, and an established
culture of teacher excellence, all American public school students will
have access to quality instruction.
266. See Esther Quintero, Why Merit Pay for Teachers Sounds Good-But Isn't, WASH. POST
(Oct. 10, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/why-merit-
pay-for-teachers-sounds-good-but-isnt/2011/10/09/gIOAVb72YLjblog.html.
267. Id.
268. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 29.
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A. Impact on Teachers
Valid evaluation systems will restore prestige and honor to the
teaching profession, as sensational stories of incompetent teachers
continuing to draw a paycheck will be a thing of the past.269 Teachers
who remain employed, and ultimately achieve tenure, will be confi-
dent that as a rule of the evaluation system, they are contributing
meaningfully to student achievement. In addition, when struggling
teachers receive feedback that their performance is inadequate, they
will use this information to improve their instruction. 270 However, if a
teacher is unable to improve, a meaningful evaluation system will pro-
vide her ongoing notice of the district's determination that she is inef-
fective, and will thus provide her the opportunity to leave the system
on her own accord. 271
Use of thoughtful, validated evaluation tools will provide effective
teachers with critical information about their professional strengths
and weaknesses. 272 Teachers can use this information to set personal
goals for improvement, identify peers to seek out as mentors, and take
notice of particular skills or talents in teaching that can be leveraged
to maximize student achievement and career advancement. Finally,
teachers who have achieved the highest ratings level will look forward
to expanding their impact beyond their own classroom. 273 Exception-
ally effective teachers will be recognized and utilized as instructional
leaders, offering a scope of opportunity that is not currently available
in the profession.
B. Impact on School Districts
A quality teacher evaluation policy will also have a tremendously
beneficial impact on school districts and administrators. Currently,
even when an administrator is certain that a teacher is not effectively
instructing her students, she is unlikely to initiate dismissal.274 How-
ever, with a summative evaluation evidencing that a teacher is ineffec-
tive, the administrator will be required to seek dismissal. The
administrator will do so confidently knowing that her decision was
carefully made in accordance with due process rights because the eval-
uation system virtually eliminates the risk of an arbitrary or capricious
269. See, e.g., Brill, supra note 3, at 30.
270. See id. at 14.
271. See id. at 29-30.
272. NCTQ, supra note 104, at 28.
273. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 29 (noting some possible outcomes of identifying
exceptional teachers).
274. See Zirkel, supra note 44.
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decision.275 Because it will no longer be costly or burdensome to dis-
miss an ineffective teacher, administrators will seek dismissal when it
is appropriate.
Similarly, an improved teacher evaluation policy will allow districts
to identify the highest performing teachers.276 This recognition can
help districts design measures to retain teachers who are exceptionally
talented. 277 Districts can also use this information to direct these su-
perior teachers to particularly challenging classrooms or instructional
leadership opportunities within the district.278 Thus, instead of highly
motivated, highly effective teachers leaving the district due to lack of
advancement opportunity, districts can retain and leverage this talent
to improve their entire teaching staffs.
C. Impact on Students
The most important impact of effective teacher evaluation, and the
impetus for its reform, is that student achievement will increase. 279
Teacher effectiveness has consistently been identified as the single
most important factor in student achievement. 280 However, systemati-
cally identifying and demanding effectiveness has been an elusive goal
in the absence of meaningful teacher evaluation. Valid and reliable
evaluation systems will establish a standard of effectiveness and guar-
antee each student an effective teacher. Each student will have a
quality public education and access to the opportunities they deserve.
V. CONCLUSION
When states fail to design and implement reliable teacher evalua-
tion policies, exceptional teachers are discounted and devalued and
ineffective teachers remain charged with educating our nation's youth.
This practice demoralizes the profession and paralyzes student
achievement. It allows incompetent teachers to remain in the class-
room, prevents districts from removing them, and forces American
students to suffer the injustice of an inadequate education. The fail-
ure to meaningfully evaluate teachers also prevents administrators
and policymakers from identifying high quality teachers and leverag-
ing their talents to improve outcomes for students. Evaluations
should give schools critical information about teachers as instructional
275. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 30.
276. See id. at 29.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, at 2.
280. See, e.g., TNTP, supra note 34, at 5-6.
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resources. Only then will schools be able to create the strongest possi-
ble instructional teams. In light of the importance of this mission, all
public education stakeholders should be invested in the goal of identi-
fying and increasing teacher effectiveness. By working in partnership,
rather than as adversaries, parents, legislators, administrators, and
teachers can chart a new trajectory for public education and ensure
that American high school graduates are ready for college, careers,
and the increasingly competitive global market place.
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